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Abstract: We study the e¤ects of government tari¤ policy in a one-sector small
open economy RBC model with a productive externality that generates social increasing
returns to scale. Various forms of endogenous uctuations, including stable 2-, 4-, 8-, and
15-cycles, quasiperiodic orbits and chaos can be identied in this model if we introduce
a constant tari¤ or subsidy (applied to the imported production factor) into the laissez-
faire economy that exhibits local indeterminacy. In a somewhat di¤erent model, Guo
and Lansing (2002) show that a constant capital tax or subsidy can give rise to similar
dynamics in a closed-economy one sector model with a productive externality. From
this perspective, factor income taxes and tari¤s are equivalent to generate endogenous
uctuations in those economies with social increasing returns to scale. We further show
that in our model, the local determinacy can coexist with the global indeterminacy for
a plausible range of tari¤ rates, which brings our attention to the use of local steady
state analysis to make conclusions about the global dynamics of the nonlinear models.
Key Words: Tari¤ Policy, Global Indeterminacy, Chaos.
JEL: E32, Q43
3
1. Introduction
It is well understood by now that those economies with incomplete markets, imperfect
competition or externalities can be easily pushed into the instability, exhibiting endoge-
nous cycles, indeterminacy or chaos1. The government usually uses monetary and scal
policies to address those issues related to the aggregate instability. We show that in a
standard one sector small open economy Ramsey model with a productive externality,
if the government wants to use the tari¤ policy to close the gap between the social and
private marginal products of imported energy (which is created by the productive ex-
ternality), it can give rise to various forms of endogenous dynamics, such as bifurcations
and chaos.
Our framework is a discrete-time version of the one-sector small open economy
growth model, recently developed by Wen and Aguiar-Conraria (2005, 2006 and 2007
henceforth WAC) [based on Benhabib and Farmer (1994)]. WAC show that in the
small open economy with the imported energy as a third production factor, as long
as the positive production externality is strong enough, the model can exhibit local
indeterminacyaround the single interior steady state.
We start our project by solving for a benchmark tari¤ policy that closes the gap be-
tween the social and private marginal products of imported energy in the WAC struc-
ture. The benchmark policy involves constant subsidy (negative tari¤) rates applied
to imported energy incomes. We show that the tari¤ rate applied to imported energy
incomes is a key bifurcation parameter for the models dynamics. In a laissez-faire econ-
omy that exhibits local indeterminacy, the dynamical system will undergo a supercritical
Hopf bifurcation as the tari¤ rate becomes su¢ ciently negative (representing a subsidy)
and a supercritical ip bifurcation as the tari¤ rate becomes su¢ ciently positive. An
attracting closed orbit or cycle emerges as the tari¤ rate passes those critical values.
Pushing the tari¤ rate beyond the critical value (  flip ) in either direction may give
way to chaos.
For the numerical calibration, the ip bifurcation occurs at the tari¤ rate of 26.33
percent. As the tari¤ rate is further increased beyond the ip bifurcation value, the
model exhibits a series of period-doubling bifurcationsa typical route to chaos. This
means that stable 2-, 4-, and 8- cycles, even chaos may appear as  varies. The economic
explanation can be traced to the paper of Guo and Lansing (2002, page 635), "...In this
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region of parameter space, the substitution e¤ect generated by expected movements in
the after-tax interest rate overcomes the corresponding income e¤ect by an amount that
is su¢ cient to induce cycling in agentsoptimal saving decisions...".
For tari¤ rates beyond the ip-bifurcation value, the equilibrium is saddle-path sta-
ble. However, the local determinacy of equilibrium near the steady state coexists with
global indeterminacy, which means that in regions away from the steady state, a stable
n-period cycle or a chaotic attractor can arise as the equilibrium paths.
The Hopf bifurcation occurs at the energy subsidy rate of 51.14 percent. If the gov-
ernment wants to encourage energy imports by setting the subsidy at or more than 51.14
percent, it will destabilize the steady state and allow for Hopf bifurcations and regular
15-cycles. As the subsidy rate is increased beyond the Hopf-bifurcation value of 51.14
percent, an attracting closed orbit will surround the steady state and quasi-periodic
oscillations arise. Further increases in the subsidy rate may make the orbit break up
into a regular 15-cycle. The economic explanation can also be found in the paper of
Guo and Lansing (2002, page 635), "...The high-subsidy region is characterized by large
intermittent spikes in hours worked which reect a bunching e¤ect in production as
agentsdecisions internalize more of the increasing returns...".
Before solving the model and doing the quantitative simulations, we briey mention
some other papers that are closely related to the contributions of ours. Some of those
papers are Cazzavillan (1996), Guo and Lansing (2002) and Coury and Wen (2008). All
of the above papers are concerned with indeterminacy issues near a single interior steady
state. In the spirit, our paper is very close to Guo and Lansing (2002)s work because
both analyze the scal policy under the framework with social increasing returns to
scale.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces tari¤
policy into the WAC model. Section 3 studies the models dynamics with constant
subsidy/tari¤ rates. Section 4 discusses some extensions. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Basic Model
The WAC (2005) model consists of three types of agents: rms, households, and the
government. They describe two competitive decentralizations that make the social tech-
nology exhibit increasing returns-to-scale. We use the version of the model with the
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externality for the ease of interpretation.
2.1. Households
The innitely-lived representative household, endowed with one unit of time, maximizes
a discounted stream of utilities over her lifetime by choosing sequences of consumption
fctg1t=0, hours to work fntg1t=0, and the stock of capital fkt+1g1t=0:
max
1X
t=0
t(log ct  B n
1+
t
1 + 
), B > 0, (1)
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor and   0 denotes the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in labor supply. We assume that no intrinsic uncertainties are
present in the economy.
The households budget constraint is
ct + it = rtkt + wtnt + Tt, (2)
where it is investment, kt is the households stock of physical capital, rt is the capital
rental rate, wt denotes the real wage and Tt is the lump-sum transfer/tax, i.e., Tt can
be negative. The household receives income by supplying capital and labor services
to rms. Fiscal policy parameters in our model include: (1) the variable Tt, which
represents the lump-sum tari¤ transfer to the agent; and (2) the implicit scal policy
parameter the tari¤ or subsidy rate imposed on the imported energy (say oil). Under
this framework, negative tari¤ rates represent energy subsidies and a negative value of
Tt represents a lump-sum tax received by the government. The household views rt, wt
and Tt as being exogenously given.
Investment follows the law of motion of capital,
kt+1 = (1  ) kt + it, k0 given, (3)
where  2 (0; 1) is the constant depreciation rate.
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The rst-order conditions for the households optimization problem are given by
Bnt =
wt
ct
, (4)
1
ct
=

ct+1
(rt+1 + 1  ), (5)
and the transversality condition is
lim
t!1
tkt+1
ct
= 0. (6)
Equation (4) requires that the households marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure be equal. Equation (5) is the consumption Euler equation.
2.2. Firms
The representative rm produces a homogenous nal good using the following constant
returns to scale technology:
yt = ztk
ak
t n
an
t o
ao
t , (7)
where yt is the rms output, ot is the third factor, say imported oil and ak+an+ao = 1,
i.e., constant returns to scale at the rm level. zt is the state of technology or the
production externality that the rm takes as given. Each rm chooses fkt; nt; otg to
maximize prots by solving
 = max
kt;nt;ot
yt   rtkt   wtnt   po (1 +  t) ot, (8)
subject to equation (7), where  t is the tari¤ rate imposed on the imported oil. We
assume that factor markets are perfectly competitive. The prot maximization implies
rt = ak
yt
kt
, (9)
wt = an
yt
nt
, (10)
po(1 +  t) = ao
yt
ot
. (11)
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From equation (11), we have poot = aoyt=(1 +  t).
In contrast to a standard RBC model, the state of technology or the production
externality zt, is given by
zt = (K
ak
t N
an
t O
ao
t )
 ,   0, (12)
where Kt, Ht and Ot are the economy-wide average input levels. In the (symmetric)
equilibrium, all rms act in the same way such that Kt = kt, Ht = ht and Ot = ot.
Hence, the social technology is given by
yt = k
k
t n
n
t o
o
t , (13)
where k  ak (1 + ), n  an (1 + ) and o  ao (1 + ). The social technology
exhibits increasing returns to scale (k + n + o > 1) for  > 0.2
Assuming that the foreign input is perfectly elastically supplied, then the factor
price, po, is independent of the factor demand for o. Thus, we have ot =
aoyt
po(1+ t)
.
Substituting this formula into the production function, we can obtain the following
reduced-form production function:
yt = Ak
k
1 o
t n
n
1 o
t , (14)
where A =

ao
po(1 +  t)
 o
1 o
acts as the technology coe¢ cient in a neoclassical growth
model, which is inversely related to the foreign factor price. In the reduced-form pro-
duction function, the e¤ective returns to scale is measured by k+n1 o , which exceeds the
real returns to scale,
k + n
1  o > (k + n + o)
2.3. Government
We assume that there is no government spending and the government transfers the tari¤
revenue to the households. The government balances the budget in each period:
Tt =  tp
oot =
ao t
1 +  t
yt.
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Using equations (2), (3), (9), (10) and poot = aoyt=(1 + ), we obtain the following
aggregate resource constraint equation:
kt+1 = (1  ) kt + yt

1  ao
1 +  t

  ct. (15)
3. Dynamics with Constant Tari¤/Subsidy Rates
As in Guo and Lansing (2002), the increasing-returns technology (13) introduces a
nonconvexity into the constraint set of the social planners problem, which makes the
Kuhn-Tucker su¢ ciency theorem not applicable to our scal policy analysis3. As an
alternative to computing the optimal tari¤ policy, we consider the following benchmark
tari¤ policy that closes the gap between the social and private marginal products of the
imported energy.
Proposition 1. The wedge between the social and private marginal products of the
imported energy is eliminated when  t = 11+   1 for all t, Tt =  aoyt for all t.
Proof. The social marginal products from equation (13) is @yt@ot = oyt=ot. The after-
tari¤ private marginal product is (1 +  t) 1ao @yt@ot . With  t =
1
1+   1 < 0, (1 +
 t)
 1ao @yt@ot = oyt=ot. The lump-sum tari¤ revenue follows directly from equation
Tt =  tp
oot =
ao t
1+ t
yt =  aoyt.
The benchmark policy involves constant subsidy rates that are only governed by the
externality parameter . A similar result is also obtained in Guo and Lansings model.
In the following analysis, we assume the tari¤ rate is constant, which implies that the
government income is endogenous.
3.1. Calibration (Quantitative Experiments)
According to the existing RBC literature, we calibrate the structural parameters for
a quarterly model. Following WAC (2005, 2006 and 2007), table 1 summarizes the
baseline parameter values.
Table 1: Baseline parameter values
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Table 1: Parameter Values
 0 Indivisible labor, see Hansen (1985).
 0:99 Discount factor, see WAC (2005, 2006).
an 0:7 Labors share.
ao 0:16 Oils share, see WAC (2005) for the country Canada.
ak 1  an   ao Capitals share.
 0:025 Depreciation rate.
B 2:984 Implies fraction of time spent working = 0.3.4
 0:203 Externality parameter.
The baseline parameter values are commonly used in real business cycle models
except the externality parameter 5. The degree of returns to scale in the model is 1+.
WAC (2005) note that minimal returns to scale needed to generate local indeterminacy
can vary dramatically depending on the degree of energy dependence of that specic
country.
Given our baseline parameter values, it requires returns to scale at least 1.198 to
exhibit local indeterminacy. We let  = 0:203 for our quantitative experiments, which
implies returns to scale around 1.203 and the benchmark scal policy parameter  b =
1
1+   1 =  0:16874. This experiment makes the laissez-faire economy exhibit local
indeterminacy, consistent with the range of indeterminacy region that WAC (2005) nd.
We should mention that a gure of 1.203 may be considered empirically implausible for
the U.S, Canada or European countries. But "the quantitative experiments reported
below should be viewed more from a methodological perspective as illustrating the
pitfalls that can arise from focusing exclusively on log-linearized dynamics rather than
considering the models true nonlinear equilibrium conditions," as suggested by Guo
and Lansing (2002, page 640).
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3.2. Log-Linearized Dynamics
In the appendix, we show that the equilibrium conditions in our model can be described
by the following log-linear system:
"
ln
 
kt+1=k

ln (ct+1=c)
#
=
24 1  213
4
1  23
4
35
| {z }
J
"
ln
 
kt=k

ln (ct=c)
#
, k0 given, (16)
where k and c are steady-state values of capital and consumption and J denotes a 2 2
Jacobian matrix of partial derivatives evaluated at the steady-state solution for the
original dynamic system. The elements of J can be represented by four constants, i,
i = 1, 2, 3, 4, which expressions can be found in the appendix. (i can be represented
by the model parameters B, ak, an, ao, , ,  and .) The two eigenvalues of J will
determine the stability of the log-linear system. The oil price po does not appear in
J and thus will not a¤ect the models local stability properties. Equations (4) and
(5) show that  not only a¤ects the tradeo¤ between consumption and leisure at a
given date (it can be seen from (4)) but also a¤ects the tradeo¤ between consumption
goods at di¤erent dates (it can be seen from (5)). As Guo and Lansing (2002, page
641) pointed out, "...the intertemporal tradeo¤ is the crucial mechanism for generating
multiple equilibria because agents expectations of future returns must become self-
fullling...".
Table 2 summarizes the models local stability properties as we allow the tari¤ rate
 to vary from  1 to +1.
Tari¤ Rate Eigenvalues of Jacobian Matrix Steady State
 <  0:5114 complex j1j = j2j > 1 Source
 =  0:5114 (Hopf Bifurcation) complex j1j = j2j = 1 Source changes to Sink
 0:5114 <  < R complex j1j = j2j < 1 Sink
R <  < 0:2633 Real j1j < 1, j2j < 1 Sink
 = 0:2633 (ip Bifurcation) Real 1 =  1, j2j < 1 Sink changes to Saddle
 > 0:2633 Real 1 <  1, j2j < 1 Saddle
Table 2: Stability Properties Near the Steady State
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3.3. Local Indeterminacy
Figure 1 plots the combinations of  (the externality parameter) and  (the tari¤ rate)
that allow for di¤erent equilibrium dynamics. Local indeterminacy requires that both
eigenvalues of J lie inside the unit circle. We know that the degree of returns to scale
in the model is 1 + . When  = 0 (CRS), the model is saddle point stable for all
values of  . The gure shows that  > 0:1976 is needed for the steady state to become
locally indeterminate. Given  > 0:1976, decreases in  eventually makes the steady
state become a source while increases in  eventually make the steady state become
a saddle point. We set  to be 0.203 in the calibration and the local indeterminacy
occurs for tari¤ rates in the range  0:5114 <  < 0:2633. When  > 0:2633, the
model exhibits a locally unique equilibrium (a saddle point). Hence, if the government
wants to stabilize the economy against sunspot uctuations near the steady state by
imposing a su¢ ciently high tari¤ rate on the imports, instead such a policy may make
the economy susceptible to other forms of endogenous uctuations, such as bifurcations
and/or chaos.
Insert Figure 1 here
3.4. Flip Bifurcation
For the numerical experiment, the dynamical system undergoes a ip bifurcation as 
is increased past the value  flip = 0:2633. We rst prove that the ip bifurcation point
is supercritical. This means that, within a small open neighborhood of  flip (in our
case  flip + "), and as  increases, the steady state goes from being a sink to being a
saddle surrounded by an attracting period2 cycle6. At the bifurcation point, we have
det(J)+ tr(J) =  1 (see Guo and Lansing (2002)). Using the expressions for det(J) and
tr(J) derived in the appendix, we can get the following bifurcation value7:
 flip =
aoH1 (+ )
H1 (+ ) + ak (H2   H1)   1, (17)
where   1=   1 is the households rate of time preference. In this model, we use
numerical simulations to establish that the ip bifurcation is supercritical8. The su-
percritical ip bifurcation will make the model exhibit deterministic cycles that wont
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converge to the steady state. The two-cycle is an attractor and in this case, the global
indeterminacy coexists with local determinacy because the steady state is a saddle point
for  > 0:2633. If we set  > 0:2633 in oder to eliminate sunspot uctuations near the
steady state, it can make the economy susceptible to sunspots, cycles, or even chaos, in
regions away from the steady state.
3.5. Hopf Bifurcation
For the numerical calibration, the dynamic system undergoes a Hopf bifurcation as 
is decreased past the value Hopf =  0:51149. At the Hopf bifurcation point, we have
det(J) = 1 (see Guo and Lansing (2002)). Using the expression for det(J) derived in the
appendix, we get the following bifurcation value10:
Hopf =
aoM4 (+ )
M4 (+ )  ak [ +M1 (+ )]   1. (18)
We use numerical simulations to establish that the Hopf bifurcation in our model is
supercritical. In the supercritical Hopf bifurcation, an attracting closed orbit emerges
on the side of Hopf where the steady state is unstable (in our case a source), that is,
in the small neighborhood Hopf   ".
The supercritical Hopf bifurcation makes our model exhibit deterministic, quasiperi-
odic oscillations that wont converge to the steady state. Because the invariant closed
orbit is an attractor, there exists a continuum of equilibrium paths each leading to the
closed orbit. This is a case of global indeterminacy.
3.6. Nonlinear Dynamics
The models perfect foresight dynamics follow the nonlinear map: (see the appendix)

ct+1
264akAk k+o 11 ot+1
0@anA
B
k
k
1 o
t+1
ct+1
1A
n
(1+)(1 o) n
+ 1  
375 = 1
ct
, (19)
kt+1 =

1  ao
1 + 

Ak
k
1 o
t
0@anA
B
k
k
1 o
t
ct
1A
n
(1+)(1 o) n
+ (1  ) kt   ct. (20)
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To simulate the global dynamics, we iterate the above map for a range of values of
 . Following Guo and Lansing (2002), the iteration proceeds as follows. We disturb the
steady state by an arbitrary amount and set our initial values (k0, c0), then we solve
equation (20) for k1. Substituting the value of k1 into equation (19) yields a nonlinear
equation that can be used to solve c1. We can repeat the procedure to compute (k2, c2)
and so on.
Figure 2 plots the bifurcation diagram and the largest Lyapunov exponent over
the range  0:51172    0:39780. Figure 3 and 4 show the details near Hopf and
 flip. The bifurcation diagram gives us the long-run behavior of the model by plotting
the last 250 points of a long simulation. The gures show that setting the tari¤ rate
beyond  flip eventually leads to chaos. Since as  increases, a signicantly positive
Lyapunov exponent occurs, which is an indicator of "sensitive dependence on initial
conditions" one of the characteristics of chaos11. The transition to chaos takes place
via a "period-doubling" route in the high-tari¤ rate region ( >  flip).
Insert Figures 2, 3 and 4 here
Figures 5 to 9 show us various forms of endogenous uctuations as  varies. Figures
5 and 6 show that the Hopf bifurcation is supercritical since the invariant closed orbit is
attracting. As  = Hopf  2:1E 4, rational expectations equilibrium paths eventually
converge to the invariant closed orbit for arbitrary starting points either inside or outside
the circle. Figure 7 shows that the invariant closed orbit starts to break up into a regular
15-cycle when the tari¤ rate is decreased to some point in the left hand side of Hopf .
In the small neighborhood of the ip bifurcation point, the model exhibits stable 2- and
4- and 8-cycles for tari¤ rates in the range of  flip <  < 0:39780. Figure 8 depicts
these three kinds of cycles and their corresponding time-series simulated data. When we
increase the value of the tari¤ rate to  = 0:39775, a type of chaotic attractors emerges
as shown in gure 9.
Changes in  have e¤ect on the amplitude of the cycles or oscillations. In the high
subsidy region, the Hopf bifurcation as one kind of rational expectations equilibria is
"characterized by large intermittent spikes in hours worked and output which reect a
bunching e¤ect in production as agentsdecisions internalize more of the increasing
returns", as suggested by Guo and Lansing (2002, page 651). In the high-tari¤ region,
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the stable n-cycle as a kind of rational expectations equilibria can be explained in the
similar way like Guo and Lansing (2002, page 652)"...the substitution e¤ect generated
by expected movements in the after-tari¤ interest rate overcomes the corresponding
income e¤ect by an amount that is su¢ cient to induce cycling in agentsoptimal saving
decisions...".
The time series plots in gures 5 through 9 give us a picture about the percentage
changes in model output and consumption. These gures indicate that the consump-
tion is quite smooth, while the output is quite volatile. The uctuation amplitudes of
output is much larger than those observed in the real Canada economy at business-cycle
frequencies. It can be due to the presence of strong increasing returns.
Insert Figures 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 here
4. Extension: Local Control Adjustment Costs
In this section, similar to Guo and Lansing (2002), we describe some policy mechanisms
which are used to eliminate sunspot uctuations near the steady state.
It is well known that explicit adjustment costs for capital investment can be used to
select a locally unique equilibrium. We then consider an economy where the household
budget constraint (2) is described by the following new equation:
ct + it
266641 +  2

kt+1
kt
  1
2
| {z }
 t()
37775 = rtkt + wtnt; (21)
the adjustment cost parameter  can be used as the bifurcation parameter. Given other
parameter values in our baseline model, the dynamical system undergoes a supercritical
ip bifurcation as  is increased past the value 0:1781.
This example shows that some local control methods can be used to select a lo-
cally unique equilibrium. However, they also have those problems that we encounter
in this paper, i.e., when global indeterminacy coexists with local determinacy, equilib-
rium selection mechanisms designed using the log-linear approximation method may be
misleading if we observe the true nonlinear dynamics in the model.
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5. Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce a constant tari¤ or subsidy rate (applied to the imported
energy) into the WAC (2005, 2006 and 2007) model. In this setting, our dynamical
equilibrium is described by a two-dimensional di¤erence equations system with one
preditermined variable (capital). And we nd that a rich set of endogenous uctuations
including bifurcations and/or chaos can arise in this setup. The dynamical system
undergoes a supercritical Hopf bifurcation as the tari¤rate becomes su¢ ciently negative,
and a supercritical ip bifurcation as the tari¤ rate becomes su¢ ciently positive. The
models equilibrium dynamics exhibit stable 2-, 4-, 8-, and 15-cycles, quasi-periodic
closed orbits, and chaos. In a somewhat di¤erent model, Guo and Lansing (2002) show
that a constant capital tax or subsidy can give rise to similar dynamics in a closed-
economy one sector model with a productive externality. From this perspective, factor
income taxes and tari¤s are equivalent to generate endogenous uctuations.
Notes:
1. See Benhabib and Farmer (1999) for an excellent survey of the literature.
2. We only consider the case k < 1, which says that the externality is not strong
enough to generate sustained endogenous growth.
3. As Guo and Lansing (2002) pointed out, the nonconvexity will make it hard for us
to compute the rst-best allocations and nd the optimal scal policy which implements
the rst-best as a competitive equilibrium.
4. Since our calibration exercise is a numerical experiment, we simply set the implied
faction of time spent on working to be 0.3, which is used in Guo and Lansing (2002).
Though 0.3 may not be exactly the one of Canada, we say our results will be robust for
reasonable parameter selection. Usually, people work 8 hours per day.
5. We should mention that our results are robust to the parameter po. In our case,
we set po = 0:1.
6. See Guckenheimer and Holmes (1983).
7. For H1 and H2, see our appendix.
8. For the analytical calculation, see Guckenheimer and Holmes (1983).
9. For the analytical calculation, see Guckenheimer and Holmes (1983).
10. For M1 and M4, see our appendix.
11. Guo and Lansing point this out (page 645), "We compute the Lyapunov ex-
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ponents according to the procedure described by Alligood et. al. (1997). Since equa-
tion (19) cannot be solved explicitly for ct+1, the required derivatives @ct+1=@kt and
@ct+1=@ct are computed numerically by log-linearizing equation (19) around each suc-
cessive point of the trajectory generated by the nonlinear map. This introduces some
approximation error into our computation so that values of the Lyapunov exponent that
are only slightly above zero are not reliable indicators of chaos."
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Appendix:
This part gives us the equations used to study the models equilibrium dynamics in
section 3.
The equilibrium conditions can be seen from the following four equations:
yt = Ak
k
1 o
t n
n
1 o
t , where A =

ao
po(1 + )
 o
1 o
, (E-1)
Bn1+t = an
yt
ct
, (E-2)
1
ct
=

ct+1

ak
yt+1
kt+1
+ 1  

, (E-3)
ct + kt+1 = (1  ) kt + yt

1  ao
1 + 

. (E-4)
For the parameter values in Table 1, we can see that there is a unique interior steady
state in this economy. Equations (E.1) and (E.2) imply:
nt =
0@anA
B
k
k
1 o
t
ct
1A
1 o
(1+)(1 o) n
=

anA
B
 1 o
(1+)(1 o) n
k
k
(1+)(1 o) n
t c
  1 o
(1+)(1 o) n
t .
which can be used to substitute nt in equations (E.3) and (E.4). Thus, we can imply
equations (19) and (20).
In the small neighborhood of the steady state, equations (19) and (20) can be ap-
proximated by the log-linearization method and we have:
"
ln
 
kt+1=k

ln (ct+1=c)
#
=
24 1  213
4
1  23
4
35
| {z }
J
"
ln
 
kt=k

ln (ct=c)
#
, k0 given,
where the four main elements are: 1 = M4+1 +M4 c
k
, 2 = M1+(1 +M1)
c
k
, 3 =
M3 (+ ) and 4 = 1 +M1 (+ ). M1 = n(1+)(1 o) n , M2 =
(1+)(1 o)
(1+)(1 o) n ,
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M3 =
(1+)(k+o 1)+n
(1+)(1 o) n and M4 =
k(1+)
(1+)(1 o) n . The steady state capital/labor
ratio
c
k
= +ak

1  ao1+

  .   1=   1 is the households rate of time preference.
The determinant and trace of J are:
det(J) =
1
4
, (E-5)
trace(J) = 1 +
1  23
4
. (E-6)
At the Hopf bifurcation point, we have det(J) = 1, and at the ip bifurcation point,
we have det(J) + trace(J) =  1.
At the Hopf bifurcation point, det(J) = 1, say,
 M4

+ 
ak

1  ao
1 + 

  

= M4     M1 (+ ) ,
Hopf =
aoM4 (+ )
M4 (+ )  ak [ +M1 (+ )]   1.
At the ip bifurcation point, det(J) + trace(J) =  1, say,
 2 M1 (+ )
=

M4 + 1   +M4 c
k

[2 +M1 (+ )]
 
h
M1 + (1 +M1)
c
k
i
M3 (+ ) .
RHS =
c
k
f2M4 +  (+ ) [M1 (M4  M3) M3]g+ 2M4 + 2 (1  )
+ (+ ) [M1M4 +M1  M1  M1M3] ;
At the ip bifurcation point,
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  c
k
f2M4 +  (+ ) [M1 (M4  M3) M3]g
= 4  2 + 2M4 +  (+ ) [M1M4 + 2M1  M1  M1M3]
= 4  2 + 2M4 +  (+ ) [M1 (M4  M3) + (2  )M1] ;
Denote H1, H2 as
H1 = 2M4 +  (+ ) [M1 (M4  M3) M3]
and H2 = 4  2 + 2M4 +  (+ ) [M1 (M4  M3) + (2  )M1], then we have
 H1

+ 
ak

1  ao
1 + 

  

= H2,
 flip =
aoH1 (+ )
H1 (+ ) + ak (H2   H1)   1.
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Figure 5B. Time-Series Plot (Attracting Circle Start Inside).
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Figure 6B. Time-Series Plot (Attracting Circle Start Outside).
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Figure 7B. Time-Series Plot (Attracting 15-Cycle).
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